Introduction.
Above-average rates of economic growth in China, India, and other Asian nations have resulted in them accounting for a growing share of global spending. On most forecasts that share will continue to rise in the decades ahead (see, for example, PWC 2013). Firms in industrialised economies eying new commercial opportunities have sought to expand their sales in, including their exports to, these fast growing markets. As the second largest economy in the world, these considerations apply with particular force to China. While Chinese growth holds out the prospect for greater cross-border trade, there is dissatisfaction with the rate at which Western firms have been able to penetrate markets in the Middle Kingdom. Some point to supply side weaknesses at home and others to Chinese protectionism, which critics claim has widened in scope since the global economic crisis began. 3 The purpose of this paper is to estimate the relative importance of the different supply side, demand side, and policy-related factors responsible for the share of exports that each of the initial 15 members of the European Union (EU) shipped to China during the years 2000 to 2010. The inclusion of the latter years was deliberate since it is of interest whether--and by which means--the recent global economic crisis affected EU exports to China. The policy instruments considered in this paper go beyond those found in most studies of crisis-era trade response. For one, information on the number of times each member state government has complained about Chinese dumping on European markets was assembled to see whether the exports from frequent complainers were treated more leniently by the Chinese or whether they became the target of Chinese retaliation. Moreover, the impact of European commercial missions to China and state aid to European firms were also estimated.
While this study is likely to be of interest to policymakers and government officials-not least given the number of high-profile trade disputes between China and the EU in 2012 and 2013-the analysis undertaken here may be of interest to academic researchers as well. That emerging markets have grown faster than the world average for some time effectively constitutes a major shift in global expenditures, providing an opportunity to study how demand side factors influence trade flows. 4 The frictionless gravity equation implies that the share of a country's exports to a foreign nation should equal the latter's share of world GDP (Anderson 1979) . This observation provides an important benchmark and begs the question:
how much of the observed changes in EU exports to China reflect "mundane" demand shifts rather than more controversial policy-related factors, such as Chinese intervention or fungible
European state aids? Moreover, our analysis of export response will add to the growing literature on the impact of the global economic crisis on trade flows (see, for example, the contributions in Baldwin 2009).
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The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. So as to provide a factual grounding for the subsequent econometric analysis, the next section includes a discussion of two stylised facts involving the growth of EU exports to China since 2000. Possible hypotheses to account for these facts are also spelt out. In the third section the econometric approach taken and data used are described. The econometric results and the decomposition of EU export growth that they imply are reported in section four. Concluding remarks are found in section five. 4 This is certainly not the first paper to examine the effect of demand patterns on trade. In this regard , the Linder Hypothesis has received some attention over the years (Linder 1961) . Later on, consideration was given as to whether departures from the traditional assumption of identical homothetic preferences could better account for observed variation in trade flows (Hunter 1991, Hunter and Markusen 1988) . 5 Other notable recent contributions on the effects of various forms of crisis-era protectionism include Kee, Neagu, and Nicita (2010) and Eaton, Kortum, Neiman, and Romalis (2011) . Such studies are to be distinguished from the larger number of studies documenting the resort to protectionism and other beggar-thy-neighbour activities since the global economic crisis began.
Stylised facts and 10 hypotheses that might account for them.
For each of the first 15 nations to join the European Union (the "EU15" from here on) an exploratory data analysis was conducted of the share of their exports to China and to the Rest of the World (ROW) for the years 2000 to 2010. For our purposes the data for the years 2009
and 2010 relate to the crisis era, allowing for comparisons before and after the onset of the global economic crisis. The principal stylised facts can be seen in the plots presented in Before and after the global economic crisis, export growth by the EU15 to China was positively correlated to export growth to the ROW (Figure 1 ). Before the crisis in only two EU member states (Sweden and Finland) was export growth to the ROW faster than that to China. For the most part, then, the share of exports destined for China rose before the crisis.
Indeed Portugal, Spain and Ireland, three of the countries that would find themselves in dire financial straits during the crisis, actually saw their exports to China grow much faster than to the ROW before the crisis struck. Whatever deep-seated "competitiveness" problems may have been building up in these countries before the crisis, it is not obvious that they harmed these countries' export performance to China, relative to their EU15 peers.
The crisis era did see some changes in EU15 export behaviour. Differences across the EU15 in export growth rates to China widened, as can be seen from the varying fortunes of There is also some evidence of convergence across the EU15 in the share of exports destined for China during the crisis era (Figure 2 ). The share of national exports going to China in 2008 is negatively correlated with the average growth rate of exports to China in the two years that followed. Germany appears to be a clear exception, combining a high initial export share (in 2008) and average levels of subsequent export growth. In this regard Finland too is probably an outlier, a point taken up during the econometric analysis.
Potential explanations.
What hypotheses might account for the variation in export performance across the EU15 reported in Figures 1 and 2 ? First, there could be member state-specific factors that influence exports. Increased government spending on goods by EU15 member states could induce home market effects 9 , resulting in higher exports in sectors where firms have economies of scale. Denote this first hypothesis H1, which implies a positive relationship between government spending on goods and exports. Alternatively, more domestic production could be diverted to government contracts thereby crowding out exports so, in fact, the predicted sign is unclear.
Member states that grant larger amounts of state aid may enable their exporters to undercut foreign rivals and win larger numbers of export contracts; denote this hypothesis H2. 10 Member states whose manufacturing firms pay on average lower hourly compensation levels may be able to undercut rivals thereby raising exports; a third hypothesis, H3.
9 Krugman (1991) . 10 Alternatively, the granting of state aid may reflect an inability to compete unhindered on world markets, in which case more state aid may well be correlated with fewer exports.
It should be noted that these three hypotheses refer to the level of overall exports. What is of interest here is whether the associated factors account for higher export shares to China, so the three hypotheses have to interpreted as to whether the factors concerned give rise to any particular edge in competing in the Chinese market. Moreover, should any of these hypotheses be rejected by the data, it does not mean they have no impact on overall exports, just the shares of exports to China.
A fourth hypothesis (H4) relates to differences in the types of good that an EU 15 nation exports and the types of good that China imports. When the composition of the former overlaps more with the composition of the latter then the export share is hypothesised to be larger.
A fifth, related hypothesis (H5) is that EU15 member states may vary in the extent to which they ship the types of products that China imports for use in its export industries.
Given the frequent and far-reaching attempts to influence Chinese export levels through changes in the VAT rebates paid to Chinese exporters on the inputs that they import (see Evenett, Fritz, and Yang 2012 for details), it will be interesting to see if the extent of such rebating interacted with an index of the similarity between a EU15 nation's exports and China's import mix accounts for some of the variation in export behaviour across Europe.
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A sixth hypothesis arises from China's growing share of world GDP. As the share of the world's spending undertaken by a country increases then it will tend to import a greater proportion of each trading partner's exports. Denote this hypothesis H6. Differences across the EU15 in the movements of their currencies against the Chinese renminbi are another potential explanation, a seventh hypothesis H7. It is worth bearing in mind in this regard that 11 More generous rebates to Chinese firms on their VAT payments for imported inputs, that are used solely in the production of exports, increase the profitability of exporting relative to selling the good on the national market. China is not alone in offering such rebates-however China is unique among the large trading nations for varying its VAT rebates so often. The ability to alter rebates on a product-by-product basis allows the Chinese authorities to target specific items. As argued in Evenett, Fritz, and Yang (2012) , the scale of this practice in China is tantamount to a system of export management.
not every EU15 nation is a member of the Eurozone (allowing for intra-EU15 exchange rate variation) and that accusations of Chinese currency manipulation were made during the decade studied here.
Turning to other policy-related hypotheses, one source of variation across the EU15 is the extent to which export-promoting commercial diplomacy is undertaken by the member states.
An eighth hypothesis (H8) is that exports are higher for those EU15 nations that send government ministers more often on official visits to China. The remaining two hypotheses concern protectionism. The ninth hypothesis (H9) is that the frequency with which a member state has encouraged the European Commission to take action against dumped Chinese exports in the past affects how China treats that member state's exports now. The effect could be positive or negative: EU15 member states with a reputation for complaining may discourage Chinese targeting of their exports or complainers may become the target of Chinese retaliation. The tenth hypothesis (H10) is that the more frequent Chinese resort to trade barriers against a EU15 member state the lower the latter's exports share.
Overall, then, these ten hypotheses relate to two demand-side 12 , three supply side (competitiveness) 13 , and five policy-induced 14 determinants of export performance. The purpose of the following econometric analysis is to assess the relative importance of these factors.
Econometric approach and data used.
While the overall goal of the empirical strategy employed here is to ascertain the relative importance of the factors that determined the share of EU15 exports sent to China between 2000 and 2010, the design of that strategy took into account a number of considerations 12 Hypotheses H4 and H6. 13 Hypotheses H1, H3, and H7. To the extent that the "crowding out" explanation applies in H1 there is a clear demand side component to this hypothesis as well. 14 Hypotheses H2, H5, H8, H9, and H10.
arising from empirical research on bilateral trade flows. First, given the strong preference among researchers in international trade for some link to underlying economic theory (Leamer and Levinsohn 2005, Feenstra 2003) , recall the prediction of the frictionless gravity equation that the share of a nation's exports shipped to a trading partner equals the latter's share of world GDP (Anderson 1979) . We used this prediction as a benchmark for export shares. Essentially, our econometric strategy amounts to examining the extent to which actual EU15 export shares to China from 2000 to 2010 departed from that benchmark in ways that are correlated with other plausible determinants of export performance (see the hypotheses described in the previous section.) Our approach, then, was not theory-free although it would be wrong to give our findings a structural interpretation.
Our approach does differ from that of traditional gravity equations, that seek to account for the variation across country pairs in the total value of bilateral trade. Gravity approaches require, therefore, taking a stand on the total value of goods that a nation has available to export. 15 By focusing on the share of a nation's goods sold to a trading partner, our approach does not require any assumptions on the overall amount of goods produced or exported. Our choice of dependent variables speaks precisely to the reorientation of exports that many governments and business people say they seek to accomplish given the return of Asia to global economic pre-eminence. Like gravity equations, however, we account for timeinvariant unobserved heteroskedacity (Baldwin and Tagloni 2006).
Denote S j,t as the share of country j's exports shipped to China in year t, CGDP t as China's share of world GDP in year t; I j,t as a vector of independent variables that are hypothesised to determine S j,t other than CGDP t ; α represents a constant; and ε j,t is a well behaved error term.
The first step is to estimate the following regression equation:
15 As Anderson (1979) has shown, various factors-such as the size of the non-traded goods sector-can affect the amount of goods that a nation can potentially export.
S j,t = α + β CGDP t + γ I j,t + ε j,t jεEU15, t=2000,….,2010 Ordinary Least Squares with exporter-specific fixed effects were used to recover the parameter estimates. In addition to recovering the residuals, the parameter estimates were also used to decompose the change in the dependent variable between 2008 and 2010 into changes attributable to each of the independent variables, CGDP t and I j,t . In this manner, then, the quantitative as well as the statistical significance of each determinant of EU15 export shares could be assessed, shedding light on which factors-if any-are really holding back EU exports to China.
Data collected and summary statistics.
Data from United Nations' COMTRADE database was used to calculate the share of each EU15 member's total exports that was shipped to China in a given year, S j,t , this being the dependent variable of this study. 17 Information contained in the World Development Indicators database of the World Bank was used to calculate the share of each EU15 nation's GDP that is accounted for by government consumption expenditure, providing the independent variable to analyse the impact of home market and crowding out effects 16 This estimator for standard errors in small samples is available in standard econometric packages, such as STATA. 17 Denote the total value of exports of a country j in year t to all foreign nations by X jt . Denote the total value of exports by country j in year t to China as x jt . Then the dependent variable is computed as follows: S j,t = x jt /X jt . mentioned in hypothesis H1. As noted earlier, the relevant estimated parameter could be positive or negative.
Data from Directorate-General of Competition of the European Commission was used to compute on an annual basis the total value of state aid offered by a EU member state as a share of its GDP. This variable is relevant for assessing hypothesis H2. Given the substantial resort to subsidies during the crisis era, the inclusion of this independent variable may be of considerable interest, although concerns about under-reporting or misclassification of such subsidies should be borne in mind. Again, as argued earlier, depending on how subsidies are allocated, the sign of the estimated parameter here could be positive or negative.
Indexing hourly compensation costs in German manufacturing in 1997 at 100 and then computing the relative nominal hourly labour costs of Germany and every other EU15 member for the years 2000 to 2010 resulted in an independent variable to assess hypothesis H3. The latter independent variable was constructed using data from the US Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics and was lagged three years to limit concerns about simultaneity. The expected sign of the estimated parameter is negative, reflecting the adverse effect of higher wages relative to Germany on export shares to China.
So as to compare the overlap between the types of goods a EU15 nation exports to China and the types of goods that China imports, each product line in the United Nations' COMTRADE database were first categorised as either raw materials, intermediate goods,
consumer goods, or capital goods. For each EU15 member state in each year of the sample, the shares of their total exports to the rest of the world (the world excluding China) that fell into the above four categories was then calculated. Likewise, for China in each year of the sample, the share of their total imports from the rest of the world (the world excluding the EU15) that fell into the same four categories was calculated. If a EU15 country exports the types of goods that China wants to buy, then looking across these four categories, the respective shares of the former and the latter should be similar. A natural index of dissimilarity is the sum across the four categories of the square of the differences in the member state's and China's shares. That index was computed for each EU15 member and for every year and is referred to here as the Differences in Composition index. This index was used to evaluate hypothesis H4; the expected sign of the parameter estimate here is negative.
Demand for European goods may also rise because of attempts to bolster Chinese exports.
One means that China uses to promote exports for which there is product-level and intertemporal variation is through rebates on Value Added Tax payments by Chinese firms on the inputs that they import from abroad and then use in the production of exports. Data on the share of Chinese exports covered by VAT rebates in a given year 18 was interacted with the Differences in Composition index to examine whether Chinese export drives account for some of the differences in EU15 exports to China, along the lines of hypothesis H5. Like hypothesis H4, the expected sign of the estimated parameter is negative.
The share of China's GDP in world GDP in a given year is computed from the World Bank data source mentioned earlier. This generates the independent variable CGDP t , which corresponds to the prediction for export shares generated by a frictionless gravity equation model (hypothesis H6). The expected sign on this independent variable is positive. 
Estimation results and implications for crisis-era export growth to China.
Table 2 reports the fixed effects regression results, which are the most conservative of the various specifications that we estimated. 20 The parameter estimates for the full sample of 15 EU member states is presented as well as the sample without Finland and Germany. Removal of these countries markedly alters the magnitude and, in some cases, the signs of the estimated parameters. Our focus, then, will be on the tendencies revealed in the data for the remaining 13 EU member states in the sample. Analysis of the apparently unusual Finnish and German exports will have to wait until a later date.
The theory-motivated, demand-side determinant of European export shares to China is not rejected by the data. In fact, in unreported results the combined explanatory power of the fixed effects and this benchmark independent variable is only a few percentage points lower than the total explained variation of the more elaborate specifications reported in Table 2 .
This finding implies that enduring time-invariant determinants of EU15 export behaviour (such as language differences, distance, differences in legal and other institutions, etc) plus
China's growing share of the world GDP go a long way to explain export performance differences across the EU15 member states and over time.
Higher labour costs, traditionally a concern expressed about the European business environment, are found to dampen export sales to China. The coefficient on this term is negative and statistically significant implying, given the construction of this independent variable, that the inability to match German wage moderation over the past decade has limited the export growth of other EU15 member states to China.
Of the remaining seven hypotheses, the only one that is not rejected by the full sample relates to the impact of making complaints about Chinese dumped exports. The numbers in Table 3 report, on the basis of the estimated coefficients and the change in an independent variable for a given EU15 country between 2008 and 2010, the percentage of the total change in that country's export share to China over the same time frame which is due to the change in the independent variable. What is striking is the large percentages of the then Chinese demand for imports would not have been skewed further away from those that the EU15 tends to supply. But for these Chinese export promotion policies, the average share of EU15 exports to China would have been just under 9 per cent higher.
While the average impact of bringing complaints to the European Commission about
Chinese exports is relatively small, this masks important variation across the EU15. France, the Netherlands, and Spain would have seen their export shares reduced by more than a tenth had they not so frequently complained about Chinese dumping. Chinese antidumping actions against France reduced the latter's export share to China by one-fourteenth or 7 per cent. On the other hand, frequent visits by French and Luxembourg ministers to Beijing have raised those countries' share of exports sent to China by a tenth and a sixth respectively, suggesting that commercial diplomacy still had leverage in the crisis era.
With decompositions reported in Table 3 , it is possible to assess for each member state the relative importance of the different factors that were responsible for the changing export shares to China witnessed during the first years of the global economic crisis. Since member states vary, the factors holding back their economies' exports to China differ. For example, such are differences in crisis-era wage movements in these countries that between four and 58 per cent of the observed changes in national export shares to China can be accounted for different trajectories in relative labour compensation levels.
Although some concerns have already been raised about data quality, readers might want to take account of the following caveats as well. First, here we focus on the time-varying determinants of export shares to China. In principle, there may be other, quantitatively important determinants that do not vary over time. While our use of fixed effects controls for the latter, nothing is revealed about their underlying nature or causes. Policymakers may well be interested in these long-standing determinants of export performance as well.
Second, like other empirical researchers in international trade, we are hampered by the lack of annual data on national trade policy stance. Data on only a few trade policy instruments have been collected over many years. In an earlier draft of this paper we employed data from the Global Trade Alert 21 for the crisis years in our sample (2009 and 2010) , specifically data on different types of protectionist measures taken by China against the EU member states. Although such data is available, after considerable efforts on our part we concluded that there was insufficient cross-sectional and inter-temporal variation to confidently estimate the effects of crisis-era Chinese protectionism.
A third concern is that changes in an independent variable may have effects over several years, not just in the year of implementation. Although various lag structures were employed, we cannot know whether the period-by-period changes in export shares have been correctly attributed to the changes in the independent variables. No doubt some may be concerned about other time-series considerations but, like almost all empirical analyses of bilateral trade flows, we set them to one side.
Concluding remarks.
During 2012 some structure to the empirical analysis. These hypotheses covered a range of potential demand-side, supply-side, and policy determinants of European exports to China. A novelty of this paper is that the range of policy-related factors considered is wider than in most papers and includes policies (subsidies and Chinese exchange rate management) that have been the subject of controversy since the onset of the global economic crisis.
Perhaps the most important finding is that, while there is much talk of commercial policies and competitiveness affecting European export performance, by far the most important factor increasing the share of EU exports shipped to China was the fact that the latter's economy continued to grow faster than the world average. China's spending clout is rising and not surprisingly more European exports are shipped to meet growing Chinese needs. To researchers of international trade patterns this is confirmation of the importance of a factor that is embedded in many models of international trade, including many variants of the gravity equation of bilateral trade flows, but which is not often analysed independently.
That global shifts in demand are important, however, does not imply that other considerations were inconsequential, including during the crisis era. Relatively high levels of labour compensation retarded EU exports to China. Some policy mattered too-Chinese export management policies reduced the shares of exports that the EU15 shipped to China during the early years of the crisis by skewing Chinese demand away from the types of goods that Europe tends to export. Other policies didn't have much effect. Those expecting that European subsidies would help reorient exports towards the fast growing Chinese market will be disappointed. Moreover, whatever "manipulation" China undertook of its exchange rate does not appear to have been holding back the growth of European export shares to the Middle Kingdom.
One of the most intriguing findings in this study is that EU member states that have over the years called for more antidumping investigations of Chinese exports appear to have their own exports to China treated more leniently by Beijing. Complaining pays, it seems. So do ministerial visits to Beijing. Should other analyses bear out these findings no doubt some analysts and policymakers will draw the conclusion that a Jekyll and Hyde approach to managing commercial relations with China delivers export sales. If that is so, then the prospects for harmonious EU and Chinese trade relations look slim. 
